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Abstract A religious perspective on life shapes how and what those with such a 
perspective learn in science; for some students a religious perspective can hinder learning 
in science. For such reasons Staver’s article is to be welcomed as it proposes a new way 
of resolving the widely perceived discord between science and religion. Staver notes that 
Western thinking has traditionally postulated the existence and comprehensibility of a 
world that is external to and independent of human consciousness. This has led to a 
conception of truth, truth as correspondence, in which our knowledge corresponds to the 
facts in this external world. Staver rejects such a conception, preferring the conception of 
truth as coherence in which the links are between and among independent knowledge 
claims themselves rather than between a knowledge claim and reality. Staver then 
proposes constructivism as a vehicle potentially capable of resolving the tension between 
religion and science. My contention is that the resolution between science and religion 
that Staver proposes comes at too great a cost – both to science and to religion. Instead I 
defend a different version of constructivism where humans are seen as capable of 
generating models of reality that do provide richer and more meaningful understandings 
of reality, over time and with respect both to science and to religion. I argue that 
scientific knowledge is a subset of religious knowledge and explore the implications of 
this for science education in general and when teaching about evolution in particular.
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Certain people, whose minds are prone to mystery, like to believe that objects retain 
something of the eyes which have looked at them, that old buildings and pictures 
appear to us not as they originally were but beneath a perceptible veil woven for 
them over the centuries by the love and contemplation of millions of admirers. 
(Proust 2000, p. 241)
It might be thought by some to be surprising that science educators need to give 
serious consideration to the relationship between science and religion and the 
implications of this for science education. However, there are a number of reasons why 
such consideration is needed. For a start, and from a rather negative perspective, there is 
growing acknowledgement that for some students a religious perspective can hinder the 
sort of science learning that most science educators would like to see. The most well 
known instance of this is learning about the topic of origins, whether of the universe, of 
life, or of humans. Indeed, many students never even get the opportunity to learn about 
evolution in any depth as curricula / textbooks in a number of countries avoid or 
minimise the time spent on evolution. More generally, it is increasingly clear that a 
religious perspective on life shapes how and what is learnt in science and in other 
domains of knowledge. Given all this, John Staver’s article in this issue is to be 
welcomed. It proposes a new way of resolving the widely perceived discord between 
science and religion. In this commentary, I first examine describe Staver’s core argument, 
and discuss the attractiveness of it, then suggest some problems with it, before proposing 
a different view of the relationship between science and religion and discussing the 
implications of this for science education.
Staver’s argument
Staver begins by noting that while theology (which I take to be the academic study of 
religion) may have a cousinly relationship with science, in that they both search for truth, 
“even though the dimensions of reality upon which they focus are different,” the interface 
between science and religion has been understood in a wide range of ways. Haught’s 
(1995) four-fold typology of conflict, contrast, contact, and confirmation is cited and then 
Staver gets to the heart of his argument, namely that “Western conceptions of truth and 
knowledge are the taproots of the discord between science and religion.” (I too am 
content to focus on the Abrahamic faiths, agreeing with Staver that the relationship 
between science and Eastern religions is more straightforward and less conflictual.)
Staver then goes on to note that Western thinking has traditionally postulated the 
existence and comprehensibility of a world that is external to and independent of human 
consciousness. This has led to a conception of truth, known as truth as correspondence, 
in which our knowledge corresponds to the facts in this external world. Members of 
religious and scientific communities each assert that they represent the correct way to 
establish valid explanations of these facts. Thus, concludes Staver, the competition 
between religion and science as social institutions continues, each attempting to 
legitimize its explanations of reality.
Staver then argues for the notion of epistemological scepticism. A moderate, rather 
than extreme (solipsistic) form is adopted and truth as coherence, rather than 
correspondence, is introduced. Whereas in truth as correspondence one attempts to make 
connecting links between what is known and the actual states of affairs in the external 
world, in truth as coherence “the links are between and among independent knowledge 
claims themselves rather than between a knowledge claim and reality. Moreover, the 
purpose in making such connections is to organize our experiences.”
The final chain of Staver’s argument, and one that is likely to be attractive to many 
science educators, especially those comfortable with cultural studies of science education, 
is to propose constructivism as a vehicle potentially capable of resolving the tension 
between religion and science. Staver maintains that “Constructivists understand the 
attraction of seeking reality, but we also grasp the fruitless nature of this task.” 
Abandoning such an attraction, constructivists with a religious faith can appreciate that 
“Knowing reality as it is, therefore, is something we never had, and to think that it has 
been revealed in God’s word is an illusion.” Staver concludes that “the empirical truth of 
science is compatible with the revealed truth of God’s word in a constructivist 
perspective, because describing reality as it exists separate from, external to, and 
independent of humans is not the goal for either science or religion.”
An evaluation of Staver’s argument
To someone, such as myself, with a religious faith and a commitment to science, 
there is much in Staver’s argument that is attractive. It proposes a way of understanding 
the relationship between science and religion that is respectful of both traditions and 
grounded in the theory of knowledge. Furthermore, his argument has major implications 
that Staver hints at in his final thought – “Will the resolution proposed herein gain any 
traction across the scholarly communities and among the public at large?” – indicating 
that the argument is potentially a fruitful one. 
However, I shall argue in this section that the resolution between science and religion 
that Staver proposes comes at too great a cost – both to science and to religion. Let me 
begin with science.
Although I have argued on a number of occasions that reality and science as an 
account of reality should be distinguished (e.g. Reiss 1993), I am reluctant to concede 
that scientific truth should be seen as coherence rather than correspondence. I do not 
intend to accuse Staver of radical scepticism, which he is careful to disavow, but his 
portrayal of truth as coherence – for all that it fits with our understanding of science as a 
community of practice, where coherence (though peer review) is central – concedes too 
much.
As is well known, a standard epistemological problem with coherence is that “it is not 
clear how the problem concerning alternative coherent belief systems is avoided” 
(O’Brien 2006, p. 83). For science, the point is that such alternative coherent belief 
systems are very rare in established science – i.e. normal, paradigmatic science sensu 
Thomas Kuhn or core science sensu Imre Lakatos. While the following has always been 
one of my favorite passages in Kuhn’s (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions:
Let us then assume that crises are a necessary precondition for the 
emergence of novel theories and ask next how scientists respond to their 
existence. Part of the answer, as obvious as it is important, can be discovered 
by noting first what scientists never do when confronted by even severe and 
prolonged anomalies. Though they may begin to lose faith and then to 
consider alternatives, the do not renounce the paradigm that has led them 
into crisis. They do not, that is, treat anomalies as counter-instances, though 
in the vocabulary of philosophy of science that is what they are. In part this 
generalization is simply a statement from historical fact, based upon 
examples like those given above and, more extensively, below. These hint 
what out later examination of paradigm rejection will disclose more fully: 
once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared 
invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place. No process 
yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all 
resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct 
comparison with nature. That remark does not mean that scientists do not 
reject scientific theories, or that experience and experiment are not essential 
to the process in which they do so. But is does mean – what will ultimately 
be a central point – that the act of judgement that leads scientists to reject a 
previously accepted theory is always based upon more than a comparison of 
that theory with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is always 
simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgement leading to 
that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and 
with each other. (p. 77)
iIt is worth citing here in two respects. First, Kuhn maintains that alternative 
paradigms are compared with nature, not only with each other; and for those of a still 
more radical disposition, Paul Feyerabend, for all his anarchism/dadaism, never rejects 
comparisons with nature – indeed, his careful historical work relied on this. Secondly, the 
scientific community is rarely truly divided in this way (“rarely” here refers not, of 
course, to the subject matter on which scientists are actually working at any one time for 
that is frontier science which is precisely where a whole swirl of competing theories, 
albeit not paradigms, may co-exist, but to the mass of normal science which is solidly 
consensual and quite firmly established); Kuhn here is writing explicitly about the 
response to crisis – for an individual scientist, generally a most rare event.
Truth as coherence as a way of understanding religious truth can be defended. But it 
is a defence that is unlikely to find favour for many with a religious outlook, aside, 
perhaps from the large number of Jewish secularists/atheists from Spinoza to the present 
day, for whom, within whichever strand of Judaism they reside, it is Jewish practice 
rather than metaphysical belief that is of central importance.
For the great majority of religious believers to admit to truth solely as coherence is 
surely to paint oneself into a corner, to abandon the attempt meaningfully to connect the 
religious view of life with reality, to restrict oneself to an isolated enclosure of religious 
understanding, distinct not only from science but from anything of much significance, 
and to lay oneself open to the accusation not so much of wishful thinking but of limited 
thinking and little wishfulness.
As will be apparent, with respect both to science and to religion, I favour a different 
version of constructivism in which the standard objections to naïve realism described by 
Staver are accepted but humans are seen as capable of generating models of reality that, 
over time, and subject to occasional reversals of fortune, do provide richer and more 
meaningful understandings of reality.
Such a view of science sits squarely within mainstream history and philosophy of 
science including its modern developments such as critical scientific realism and 
inference to the best explanation. Within religion there is, I admit, more diversity but I 
would still hold that mainstream theology occupies a realist position). I also feel that 
Staver has too narrow a conceptualisation of religion when he writes that the legitimizing 
force of religion is ‘God’s revealed truth in how humans are to live’. This is to focus only 
on the ethical and legal dimension of religion how – so Sunni Islam has its Five Pillars, 
Shahada (testimony of faith), Salat (prayer), Zakat (alms-giving), Sawm (fasting) and 
Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), while Judaism has the Ten Commandments and other 
regulations in the Torah and Buddhism its Five Precepts. A more typical view, derived 
from Smart (1989) and Hinnells (1991), sees the following dimensions as also being 
generally characteristic of most religions:
• the practical and ritual dimension that encompasses such elements as worship, 
preaching, prayer, yoga, meditation and other approaches to stilling the self;
• the experiential and emotional dimension of religions that has both the rare 
visions given to some of the crucial figures in a religion’s history, such as that of 
Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gita and the revelation to Moses at the burning bush in 
Exodus, and the experiences and emotions of many religious adherents, whether a 
once-in-a-lifetime apprehension of the transcendent or a more frequent feeling of 
the presence of God either in corporate worship or in the stillness of one’s heart;
• vital stories that comprise the narrative or mythic dimension, for example the 
story of the six day creation in the Judaeo-Christian scriptures;
• the doctrinal and philosophical dimension that arises, in part, as theologians 
within a religion struggle to integrate the narrative/mythic dimension into a more 
general view of the world; so, for example, the early Christian church came to its 
understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity by combining the central truth of the 
Jewish religion – that there is but one God – with its understanding of the life and 
teaching of Jesus Christ and the working of the Holy Spirit;
• the social and institutional dimension of a religion that relates to its corporate 
manifestation, for example the Sangha – the order of monks and nuns founded by 
the Buddha to carry on the teaching of the Dharma – in Buddhism, the umma’ – 
the whole Muslim community – in Islam, and the Church – the communion of 
believers comprising the body of Christ – in Christianity;
• the material dimension, namely the fruits of religious belief as shown by places of 
worship (e.g. synagogues, temples and churches), religious artefacts (e.g. Eastern 
Orthodox icons and Hindu statues) and sites of special meaning (e.g. the river 
Ganges, Mount Fuji and Uluru (Ayers Rock)).
A different view of the relationship between science and religion
As Staver indicates, there are a wide range of ways of seeing the relationship between 
science and religion, Barbour’s (1990) earlier one of conflict, independence, dialogue and 
integration is also widely used in the science and religion literature). Understandings of 
the relationship(s) between science and religion vary greatly, at least in part because of 
considerable variation in how people conceptualise both science and religion, especially 
religion.
One approach that I have found to be of worth in science classes with undergraduates 
training to be science teachers is, when teaching about the nature of science, to get them 
to think about the relationship between scientific knowledge and religious knowledge 
(Reiss 2008). What seems to work well is to ask students, either on their own or in pairs, 
to indicate this relationship by means of a drawing, and then for all of us in the class to 
discuss the various drawings that result. See, for example, the hypothetical representation 
in Figure 1. A person producing the representation in Figure 1 sees both religious and 
scientific knowledge as existing but envisages the scope of religious knowledge as being 
smaller than that of scientific knowledge and of there being no overlap between the two.
Figure 1 Hypothetical representation of how someone who sees both religious and scientific knowledge as 
existing but envisages the scope of religious knowledge as being smaller than that of scientific knowledge 
and of there being no overlap between the two might draw the relationship between religious knowledge 
(RK, left) and scientific knowledge (SK, right).
A number of science educators favour such a clear-cut distinction between religious 
and scientific knowledge, along the lines of that defended by Gould (1999). There are a 
number of advantages to such a position. For example, it allows a person with a strong 
religious belief who might otherwise be troubled by certain aspects of science to avoid 
possible conflict (and vice versa) and it provides an epistemological justification for why 
religious matters should not be examined in science classes, which is useful in a country 
such as the USA that prohibits the teaching of religion in public schools. However, there 
are many for whom scientific knowledge and religious knowledge are not distinct. At one 
end are those who draw religious knowledge as being much smaller than scientific 
knowledge and wholly or partly contained within it (Figure 2); at the other are those 
whose worldview is predominantly religious (Figure 3). My own position is close to that 
shown in Figure 3, the one difference being that I would increase the size of the ellipse 
representing scientific knowledge (perhaps by about 50% along each of its two 
dimensions) but still enclose it fully within the ellipse representing religious knowledge. 
Let me know explain what I consider such a representation to mean.
Figure 2 Hypothetical representation of how someone who sees religious knowledge as being much smaller 
than scientific knowledge and almost entirely contained within it might draw the relationship between 
religious knowledge (RK) and scientific knowledge (SK).
Figure 3 Hypothetical representation of how someone whose worldview is predominantly religious might 
draw the relationship between religious knowledge (RK) and scientific knowledge (SK).
First, although I embed scientific knowledge entirely within religious knowledge, this 
does not mean that I hold that scientific knowledge can be obtained from religious 
sources. If there is any conflict about scientific knowledge between the teachings of 
science and those of religion (whether from the readings of the scriptures, from revelation 
or from the teachings of individuals held to have a particular authority within the 
religion) I am nearly always on the side of science. (I saw “nearly always” not as a cop 
out but because, as we know, science is fallible and it is not inconceivable, though most 
unlikely nowadays, that a particular instance of scientific conflict between science and 
religion might subsequently, and scientifically, be resolved in favour of the religious 
reading.) This, of course, distinguishes my position (and that of many other religious 
believers) from the many Christians, Hindus, Muslims and others who believe that 
religion (usually in the scriptures) provides a source (usually a divine revelation) of 
reliable scientific knowledge. (At the risk of labouring the point, I am perfectly content 
with the idea that the scriptures may contain reliable scientific knowledge but this is 
simply a reflection of their incorporation of aspects of widely known science, e.g. 
traditional ecological knowledge, at the time they were authored.)
Second, the reason why my SK ellipse is quite small compared to my RK ellipse is 
simply that there are a non-inconsiderable number of elements in my RK view of the 
world that sit outside of science. (In the same way, my visual representation of physics 
knowledge would be smaller than one for biology knowledge as all of physics sits within 
biology whereas there is much biology that is not explicable by physics, for all that 
biology is consistent with the laws of physics.) For example, I have spent some time 
thinking about such matters as the virgin birth, the resurrection and whether there is a 
world to come but all these matters sit outwith science – as do many non-religious issues, 
such as whether there is an infinity of primes (mathematics – there are), whether actions 
can always be judged ethically in terms of their consequences alone (moral philosophy – 
I am not sure), whether Jackson Pollock is as great an artist as Claude Lorrain (aesthetics 
– probably, in my view) and so on.
General implications for science education
It is difficult to provide generalised suggestions as to how science educators might 
deal with the interface between science and religion as context is so important; indeed 
there are, of course, countries (e.g. France, Turkey, USA) where a separation between 
religion and the state there are legal restrictions in force in respect of what can be taught. 
In general, the principal reason for science educators dealing with the interface between 
science and religion is to help students (whatever their age and whether their science 
education is formal or informal) better to learn science.
Teaching about aspects of religion in science classes could potentially help students 
better understand the strengths and limitations of the ways in which science is 
undertaken, the nature of truth claims in science, and the importance of social contexts 
for science. In that sense, considering religion within science education places the issue 
squarely within the consideration of mainstream socio-scientific issues.
However, there are also reasons to be cautious before teaching about aspects of 
religion in science classes (Reiss 1992). For example, a science teacher might feel that 
they simply do not have the expertise to teach effectively about such matters (though my 
experience and that of others is that initial teacher education and continuing professional 
development can help address this need), that these matters are better dealt with 
elsewhere in the curriculum (in some cases co-operation with other subject departments 
can be fruitful), or that it is impossible to teach objectively about such matters so that one 
risks indoctrinating one’s students either into or away from a religious faith. More 
mundanely, there are frequently the constraints of curriculum time.
Implications when teaching about evolution
To some people’s alarm, and others’ delight, creationism is growing in extent and 
influence, in a number of countries. Definitions of creationism vary but about 40% of 
adults in the USA and probably over 10% in all other countries surveyed (Miller et al. 
2006) believe that the Earth is only some ten thousand or so years old, that it came into 
existence as described in the early parts of the Bible or the Qur’an and that the most that 
evolution has done is to change species into closely related species (Jones and Reiss 
2007). For a creationist it is possible that the various species of, for example, lemmings 
had a common ancestor but this is not the case for lemmings, rabbits and beavers – still 
less for lemmings and humans, for lemmings and trilobites or for lemmings and edible 
mushrooms.
At the same time, of course, the overwhelming majority of biologists consider 
evolution to be the central concept in the biological sciences and to be as well established 
as any unifying scientific theory, providing a conceptual framework that brings together 
every aspect of the life sciences into a single coherent discipline. Equally, the 
overwhelming majority of scientists believe that the universe is of the order of about 13–
14 billion years old. 
The public presentation of the controversy in the media and elsewhere often gives the 
impression that biblical creationism and biological evolution refer to two mutually 
exclusive explanatory systems. The lower visibility of presentations of alternative views 
creates the impression in many people’s minds that a clear delineation exists between 
those who support scientific theories and those who adhere to scriptural teachings. This 
highly publicized schism between a number of religious worldviews, particularly Judaeo-
Christian views based on Genesis and mainstream Islamic readings of the Qur’an, and 
modern scientific explanations derived from the theory of evolution is exacerbated by the 
way people are often asked in surveys or interviews about their views on human origins. 
There is a tendency to polarize religion and science in questionnaires that focus on the 
notion that either God created everything or God had nothing at all to do with it. The 
choices used in public polls may erroneously imply that scientific evolution is necessarily 
atheistic, coupling complete acceptance of evolution with explicit exclusion of any 
religious premise. Most surveys contain only a small number of options that makes 
analysis easy, “clean” and strictly numeric. The limited number of categories forces 
people to codify their views to fit into, at best, three or four predetermined categories and 
misses more nuanced, even conflictual, information about what they are actually 
thinking.
In fact, people have personal beliefs about religion and science that cover a wide 
range of possibilities. Eugenie Scott (1999) and others have proposed that individuals 
hold a spectrum of views, ranging from young-Earth creationists to those for whom the 
scientific and religions worldviews are integrated into one. When faced with individuals 
who hold creationist views, science educators might be best advised to see creationism 
not as a naïve misconception but as a worldview, in other words as a fairly robust 
(durable) and well established (well defended) mental structuring of reality. The most 
that a science teacher can normally aspire to is to ensure that students with creationist 
beliefs understand the scientific position. In the short term, this scientific worldview is 
unlikely to supplant a creationist one.
Most of the literature on creationism (and/or intelligent design) and evolutionary 
theory puts them in stark opposition (Reiss, in press). Evolution is consistently presented 
in creationist books and articles as illogical (e.g. natural selection cannot, on account of 
the second law of thermodynamics, create order out of disorder; mutations are always 
deleterious and so cannot lead to improvements), contradicted by the scientific evidence 
(e.g. the fossil record shows human footprints alongside animals supposed by 
evolutionists to be long extinct; the fossil record does not provide evidence for 
transitional forms), the product of non-scientific reasoning (e.g. the early history of life 
would require life to arise from inorganic matter – a form of spontaneous generation 
rejected by science in the 19th century; radioactive dating makes assumptions about the 
constancy of natural processes over aeons of time whereas we increasingly know of 
natural processes that affect the rate of radioactive decay), the product of those who 
ridicule the word of God, and a cause of a whole range of social evils (eugenics, 
Marxism, Nazism, racism, juvenile delinquency).
By and large, creationism has received similarly short shrift from those who accept 
the theory of evolution. In a fairly early study the philosopher of science Philip Kitcher 
(1983) argues that “in attacking the methods of evolutionary biology, Creationists are 
actually criticizing methods that are used throughout science” (pp. 4–5). Kitcher 
concludes that the flat-earth theory, the chemistry of the four elements, and mediaeval 
astrology “have just as much claim to rival current scientific views as Creationism does 
to challenge evolutionary biology” (p. 5). Many scientists have defended evolutionary 
biology from creationism. The main points that are frequently made are that evolutionary 
biology is good science since not all science consists of controlled experiments where the 
results can be collected within a short period of time; that creationism (including 
“scientific creationism”) is not really a science in that its ultimate authority is scriptural 
and theological rather than the evidence obtained from the natural world; and that an 
acceptance of evolution is fully compatible with a religious faith.
The relationship between science and religion has changed over the years. 
Nevertheless, there are two key issues fueling the evolution/creationism controversy: one 
is to do with understandings of reality, the other to do with evidence and authority. 
Although it is always desperately difficult to generalize, most religions hold that reality 
consists of more than the observable world, and many religions give weight to 
institutional authority in a way that science generally strives not to.
      Given the often unsuccessful history of scientists’ participation in educational battles 
over evolution, it seems hopeful that a pluralistic position, promoting cultural tolerance 
and individual autonomy, has a better chance of ensuring that students at the very least 
learn what evolution is. In the past, science has all too often exacerbated this 
evolution/creation conflict by appearing to dismiss the legitimacy of religious ideas and 
the validity of personal beliefs.
Classroom specifics
Many scientists, and some science educators, fear that consideration of creationism or 
intelligent design in a science classroom legitimises them. For example, the excellent 
book Science, Evolution, and Creationism published by the U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences and Institute of Medicine asserts “The ideas offered by intelligent design 
creationists are not the products of scientific reasoning. Discussing these ideas in science 
classes would not be appropriate given their lack of scientific support” (National 
Academy of Sciences and Institute of Medicine 2008, p. 52).
I agree with the first sentence but disagree with the second. Just because something 
lacks scientific support does not seem to me a sufficient reason to omit it from a science 
lesson. When I was taught physics at school, and taught it extremely well in my view, 
what I remember finding so exciting was that we could discuss almost anything providing 
we were prepared to defend our thinking in a way that admitted objective evidence and 
logical argument. (I should add that my teacher, Colin Harris, was excellent at ensuring 
after such discussions that we still covered the intended, core physics; a discussion about 
the meaning of gravity was no substitute from understanding how to calculate G, the 
gravitational constant, and then use the value in calculations of gravitational attraction.)
In an interesting exception that proves the rule, I recall one of our advanced level 
chemistry teachers scoffing at a fellow student who had sat the previous evening with a 
spoon in front of her while Uri Geller maintained on national television he could bend 
viewers’ spoons. I was all for this approach. After all, I reasoned, surely the first thing 
was to establish if the spoon bent (it did not for her) and if it did, then start working out 
how.
So when teaching evolution, there is much to be said for allowing students to raise 
any doubts they have (hardly a revolutionary idea in science teaching) and doing one’s 
best to have a genuine discussion. The word “genuine” does not mean that creationism or 
intelligent design deserve equal time. However, in certain classes, depending on the 
comfort of the teacher in dealing with such issues, any school or other regulations / 
accepted practice and the make up of the student body, it can be appropriate to deal with 
the issue.
If questions or issues about creationism and intelligent design arise during science 
lessons they can be used to illustrate a number of aspects of how science works such as 
“how interpretation of data, using creative thought, provides evidence to test ideas and 
develop theories”; “that there are some questions that science cannot currently answer, 
and some that science cannot address”; “how uncertainties in scientific knowledge and 
scientific ideas change over time and about the role of the scientific community in 
validating these changes” (these phrases are taken from the current National Curriculum 
for science in England [QCA 2009], but have wider currency).
Having said that, I do not believe that such teaching is easy. Some students get very 
heated; others remain silent even if they disagree profoundly with what is said. The 
current official Guidance in England from the Department for Children, Schools and 
Families suggests: “Some students do hold creationist beliefs or believe in the arguments 
of the intelligent design movement and/or have parents/carers who accept such views. If 
either is brought up in a science lesson it should be handled in a way that is respectful of 
students’ views, religious and otherwise, whilst clearly giving the message that the theory 
of evolution and the notion of an old Earth / universe are supported by a mass of evidence 
and fully accepted by the scientific community” (DCSF 2007, p. ???).
I do believe in taking seriously and respectfully the concerns of students who do not 
accept the theory of evolution while still introducing them to it. While it is unlikely that 
this will help students who have a conflict between science and their religious beliefs to 
resolve the conflict, good science teaching can help students to manage it – and to learn 
more science. Creationism can profitably be seen not as a simple misconception that 
careful science teaching can correct in the same way as careful science teaching might 
hope to persuade a student that an object continues at uniform velocity unless acted on by 
a net force, or that most of the mass of a plant comes from air. Rather, a student who 
believes in creationism can be seen as inhabiting a non-scientific worldview, that is, a 
very different way of seeing the world. One very rarely changes one’s worldview as a 
result of a 50-minute lesson, however well taught.
My hope, rather, is simply to enable students to understand the scientific worldview 
with respect to origins, not necessarily to accept it. We can help students to find their 
science lessons interesting and intellectually challenging without their being threatening. 
Effective teaching in this area can not only help students learn about the theory of 
evolution but better to appreciate the way science is done, the procedures by which 
scientific knowledge accumulates, the limitations of science and the ways in which 
scientific knowledge differs from other forms of knowledge.
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